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REVISITING PARENTS INVOLVED V. 
SEATTLE SCHOOL DISTRICT: 
RACE CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE 
GOVERNMENT-SPEECH DOCTRINE 
JOSEPH O. OLUWOLE* 
INTRODUCTION 
School districts have voluntarily adopted plans to address persistent 
racial de facto segregation/re-segregation in education and to ensure that 
students are exposed to a diverse student population reflective of the 
American society.  Despite the benefits these race-conscious plans seek, 
there has been some legal and social opposition to the plans. It was such 
opposition that led to the  Parents Involved in Community Schools v. 
Seattle School District No. 11  case and several earlier cases.2  The plans 
have been challenged under the Equal Protection Clause and failed under 
the strict-scrutiny standard of review.  This is because, as constitutional 
  * Joseph O. Oluwole, Attorney-at-Law and Associate Professor of Education and Law at 
Montclair State University. J.D., The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law; Ph.D., The 
Pennsylvania State University.  I would like to extend my deep gratitude to Natalie Lyons, Executive 
Articles Editor, and Alexandra Vesalga, Editor-in-Chief, of Golden Gate University Law Review for 
their invaluable help with this Article. 
 1 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No.1 (Parents Involved IV), 551 U.S. 
701 (2007). 
 2 See, e.g., Brewer v. W. Irondequoit Cent. Sch. Dist., 212 F.3d 738 (2d Cir. 2000); Tuttle v. 
Arlington Cnty. Sch. Bd., 195 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 1999) (per curiam); Hunter v. Regents of the Univ. 
of Cal., 190 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 1999); Ho by Ho v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., 147 F.3d 854 (9th Cir. 
1998); Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790 (1st Cir. 1998); Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 100 F. 
Supp. 2d 57 (D. Mass. 2000). 
1
Oluwole: Race Consciousness and Government Speech
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2013
394 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43 
 
law scholar Gerald Gunther has aptly noted, strict scrutiny is “strict in 
theory and fatal in fact.”3 
This social and legal opposition has intimidated school districts into 
pulling back efforts to implement race-conscious plans.4  If this trend 
continues, fewer and fewer students will have the opportunity to interact 
with students of other races before they proceed to college and the larger 
society.  We need to provide our schools with the tools and discretion 
necessary to ensure that students get educated in racially diverse settings.  
The government-speech doctrine—a “recently minted” judicial 
doctrine5—is empowering for schools seeking to promote such inclusive 
education. 
Professor William M. Carter, Jr.’s trailblazing work, Affirmative 
Action As Government Speech,6 first examined the relationship between 
government speech and race-conscious measures.7  According to 
Professor Carter, the United States Supreme Court “has come to view 
race-conscious government action as a form of prohibited government 
speech.”8  This Article takes a different approach from that of Professor 
Carter; specifically, the Article reviews the majority, dissenting, and 
concurring opinions in the Parents Involved case for language indicating 
the Justices’ parameters for viewing voluntary race-conscious measures 
as government speech.  This is important, given that Parents Involved is 
the landmark Supreme Court decision on race-conscious measures at the 
K-12 school level. 
The government-speech doctrine is particularly apropos when 
schools desire to “achieve or maintain racial integration through the use 
of race-conscious student assignment plans, under which the race of all 
students is equally considered and all students receive a spot in the public 
schools.”9  In such cases, opposition has been mostly to the message the 
 3 Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A 
Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972). 
 4 See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Boston Sch. Comm., 938 F. Supp. 1001, 1018 (D. Mass. 1996). 
 5 Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 481 (2009) (Stevens, J., 
concurring); see Helen Norton & Danielle Keats Citron, Government Speech 2.0, 87 DENV. U. L. 
REV. 899, 904 (2010) (“The U.S. Supreme Court did not recognize government speech as a 
constitutional law doctrine, however, until quite recently.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see 
also Wells v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 257 F.3d 1132, 1140 (10th Cir. 2001) (“The Supreme Court 
has provided very little guidance as to what constitutes government speech.”). 
 6 William M. Carter, Jr., Affirmative Action As Government Speech, 59 UCLA L. REV. 2 
(2011). 
 7 See generally id. (discussing how the United States Supreme Court has come to view 
affirmative action as government speech in its opinions). 
 8 Id. at 2 (emphasis added). 
 9 Id. at 7. 
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voluntary race-conscious measure sends rather than the measure itself.10  
Indeed, the very concept of race-consciousness is expressive, conveying 
a message that race matters.  Opposition is often based on the 
“colorblind” view that tries to convey the opposite message: race does 
not matter.  As Professor Carter observed: 
The strict colorblindness doctrine treats any remedial or diversifying 
government race consciousness as constitutionally suspect because of its 
message alone.  The message of such government action is condemned 
because it is counter to what the Court has found to be a more important 
message.  That message can be characterized in a variety of ways: liberal 
individualism, postracialism, antipaternalism, or antibalkanization.11 
The government-speech doctrine would effectively ensure that the 
government is not in violation of “private parties’ First Amendment 
rights when it prevents them from joining or altering what is really the 
government’s own speech.”12  In other words, the government-speech 
doctrine would protect the government from liability when it promotes a 
diverse elementary and secondary education.  Under that premise, this 
Article analyzes the individual opinions in Parents Involved to determine 
whether the Justices would support race-conscious programs under the 
government-speech doctrine. 
Part I of this Article describes the government-speech doctrine.  Part 
II describes the Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence (the traditional 
weapon of choice for those challenging race-conscious measures, due to 
the potency of the strict-scrutiny test).  Part III presents the facts of the 
Parents Involved case.  Part IV examines the opinions of the United 
States Supreme Court Justices in Parents Involved in light of the 
government-speech doctrine.13  The Article concludes that the 
government-speech doctrine would provide schools needed leeway to 
pursue race-conscious measures. 
 10 See id. 
 11 Id. at 30 (footnotes omitted). 
 12 Helen Norton, The Measure of Government Speech: Identifying Expression’s Source, 88 
B.U. L. REV. 587, 600 (2008). 
 13 Chief Justice Roberts wrote the plurality opinion, and Justices Alito, Thomas, and Scalia 
joined that opinion.  Parents Involved IV, 551 U.S. 701, 708 (2007).  Justice Kennedy—the swing 
vote in Parents Involved IV—concurred in the judgment and wrote a separate opinion.  Id. at 782.  
Justice Breyer wrote a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Souter, and 
Justice Stevens wrote a brief dissent.  Id. at 798, 803. 
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I.  WHAT IS THE GOVERNMENT-SPEECH DOCTRINE? 
A.  DEFINITION 
Government speech simply means speech by a government entity.14  
Thus, government speech would encompass speech by school districts.  
Professor Carter points out that race-conscious measures constitute 
symbolic speech under the United States Supreme Court’s two-prong 
test:15 first, race-conscious measures are intended to “convey a 
particularized message”16 of diversity and inclusion;17 and second, “in 
the surrounding circumstances the likelihood [is] great that the message 
would be understood.”18  Legal scholar Charlotte Taylor describes 
government speech as follows: 
Government speech is a broad category that includes any government 
action that communicates or subsidizes the communication of a 
particular message.  It encompasses activities from appropriating 
taxpayer money to campaign for or against specific legislative 
measures to deciding who gets access to public fora such as theatres 
and broadcasting frequencies to offering a program of subsidies for 
expression—for example, funding for the arts—that makes content-
based decisions among qualified applicants.  The government can be 
said to ‘speak’ when it pays for speech directly, when it provides 
 14 See Andy G. Olree, Identifying Government Speech, 42 CONN. L. REV. 365, 368 (2009) 
(“Government then becomes one of a host of speakers competing in the marketplace of ideas.  Our 
notion of freedom of speech has not demanded that the government abstain from such a role, nor 
have we required government to endorse all viewpoints equally as it sends its messages.”). 
 15 See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989) (“In deciding whether particular conduct 
possesses sufficient communicative elements to bring the First Amendment into play, we have asked 
whether an intent to convey a particularized message was present, and whether the likelihood was 
great that the message would be understood by those who viewed it.” (internal quotation marks and 
brackets omitted) (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974)). 
 16 Spence, 418 U.S. at 410-11. 
 17 See Carter, supra note 6, at 36-39. 
 18 Spence, 418 U.S. at 411; see Carter, supra note 6, at 39-41; Joseph Blocher, Viewpoint 
Neutrality and Government Speech, 52 B.C. L. REV. 695, 754 (2011) (“[B]urning a draft card to 
express opposition to the draft is an undifferentiated whole, 100% action and 100% expression . . . .  
Attempts to determine which element ‘predominates’ will therefore inevitably degenerate into 
question-begging judgments about whether the activity should be protected.  As it is with speech 
activities, so it is with speech regulations—they are ‘100%’ expressive.  If the government’s 
expressive interests are to be recognized, then those interests are undoubtedly implicated fully in 
every speech regulation the government passes.” (internal quotation marks and footnote omitted) 
(quoting John Hart Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and 
Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1495 (1975)). 
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access to public property for the communication of a given message, 
or when an elected official voices her opinion on a given issue.19 
Government speech serves several functions.  According to 
Professor Gia B. Lee, government speech 
may, for example, seek to inform the public of matters the government 
deems relevant, to rally support for governmental policies and 
practices, to encourage or deter certain behavior, or to communicate 
shared values and perspectives.  In doing so, a government seeks to 
shape public awareness, influence public opinion, or secure popular 
support.20 
Racial diversity, equity, and inclusion are values a school district could 
seek to rally support for or communicate through government speech in 
the form of race-conscious measures.  Through such measures, a school 
district performs the government-speech function of cultivating social 
consciousness of the importance of racial unity and diversity to the 
sustenance of our democratic republic. 
The government-speech doctrine started with the “rather benign 
idea that of course the government can speak to its public, its democratic 
rulers.  Indeed, the government must speak, and propose, and defend, and 
inform in order for democracy to work.”21  The government must speak 
in order to fulfill democracy’s ideals of individual liberty and self-
government.22  Moreover, without government speech, “the polity cannot 
engage in the business of government, evaluate government policy, or 
disagree and dissent.”23 
As recently as August 2010, retired United States Supreme Court 
Justice Souter stated that the government-speech doctrine is currently at 
 19 Charlotte H. Taylor, Hate Speech and Government Speech, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1115, 
1142-43 (2010). 
 20 Gia B. Lee, Persuasion, Transparency, and Government Speech, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 983, 
992 (2005).  For further discussions of some benefits of government speech, see Blocher, supra note 
18, at 750-51. 
 21 Randall P. Bezanson, The Manner of Government Speech, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 809, 810 
(2010); see also The Supreme Court 2008 Term, Government Speech, 123 HARV. L. REV. 232, 238 
(2008) (“Government speech doctrine is justified at its core by the idea that, in order to function, 
government must have the ability to express certain points of view, and it would be unable to do so 
effectively if, for example, the Constitution required a government pro-democracy campaign to be 
accompanied by a pro-fascism campaign.” (footnote omitted)). 
 22 Bezanson, supra note 21, at 812. 
 23 Id. 
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an “adolescent stage of imprecision.”24  Despite its novelty and 
imprecision, the government-speech doctrine is here to stay.25 
When the government speaks, the government-speech doctrine 
creates a strong defense to a plaintiff’s claim that the government has 
engaged in viewpoint discrimination.26  This disempowers plaintiffs who 
claim a deterioration of First Amendment rights.  After all, as Professors 
Helen Norton and Danielle Keats Citron note, “Political accountability 
mechanisms such as voting and lobbying then provide the sole recourse 
for those displeased by their government’s expressive choices.”27  Yet if 
used prudently, as in the case of race-conscious measures designed to 
enhance diversity of public education, the government-speech doctrine 
might be a powerful force for democratic values like tolerance, equality, 
and acceptance. 
B.  JUDICIAL EVOLUTION OF THE GOVERNMENT-SPEECH DOCTRINE 
The origins of the government-speech doctrine can be traced to Rust 
v. Sullivan.28  The doctrine was obscure in Rust, as the term “government 
speech” was never used in the case;29 however, the United States 
Supreme Court has since noted Rust as the origin of the doctrine.30 
Rust involved a First Amendment challenge to federal regulations 
precluding Title X fund recipients from performing abortion-related 
activities.31  The petitioners argued that the regulations violated the Free 
Speech Clause because they barred “all discussion about abortion as a 
lawful option—including counseling, referral, and the provision of 
neutral and accurate information about ending a pregnancy—while 
 24 Griswold v. Driscoll, 616 F.3d 53, 54, 59 n.6 (1st Cir. 2010); see also Page v. Lexington 
Cnty. Sch. Dist. One, C.A. No. 3:06-249-CMC, 2007 WL 2123784, at *6 (D.S.C. 2007) (stating that 
the government-speech doctrine is “relatively new and its limits remain imprecisely defined and 
subject to some debate”). 
 25 Bezanson, supra note 21, at 809 (stating that the government-speech doctrine is “now a 
largely uncontroversial rule that when the government is speaking, its expressive actions are immune 
from First Amendment freedom of speech limits”). 
 26 Norton & Citron, supra note 5, at 901; see also id. at 901-02 (stating that the government 
is not mandated to publicly disclose itself “as the source of a contested message to satisfy the 
government speech defense to a First Amendment claim”). 
 27 Id. at 904. 
 28 Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991). 
 29 See Norton & Citron, supra note 5, at 905 (“Nowhere in Rust does the term ‘government 
speech’ appear.”). 
 30 See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 541 (2001) (“The Court in Rust did 
not place explicit reliance on the rationale that the counseling activities of the doctors under Title X 
amounted to governmental speech; when interpreting the holding in later cases, however, we have 
explained Rust on this understanding.”); see also Norton & Citron, supra note 5, at 904 & n.25. 
 31 Rust, 500 U.S. at 177-78. 
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compelling the clinic or counselor to provide information that promotes 
continuing a pregnancy to term.”32  The Supreme Court disagreed, noting 
that there was “no question” about the constitutionality of the 
regulations.33  The Court reasoned that the government can promote or 
favor certain values; and therefore the “government may make a value 
judgment favoring childbirth over abortion, and . . . implement that 
judgment by the allocation of public funds.”34 
In an early articulation of the government-speech doctrine, the 
Supreme Court declared: 
The Government can, without violating the Constitution, selectively 
fund a program to encourage certain activities it believes to be in the 
public interest, without at the same time funding an alternative 
program which seeks to deal with the problem in another way.  In so 
doing, the Government has not discriminated on the basis of 
viewpoint; it has merely chosen to fund one activity to the exclusion 
of the other.  A legislature’s decision not to subsidize the exercise of a 
fundamental right does not infringe the right.35 
To illustrate this point, the Court pointed out that, if Congress chooses to 
fund a program like the National Endowment for Democracy to promote 
democracy in other countries, the Constitution does not require Congress 
to also fund programs supporting competing political philosophies such 
as fascism and communism.36  Accordingly, if a school district supports 
race-conscious measures designed to promote diversity, it is not required 
to support measures to oppose diversity. 
The Supreme Court found that the government’s mere refusal to 
fund or support a particular activity is not equivalent to the government 
penalizing that activity.37  The Court distinguished between the 
government choosing to support an activity and government interfering 
with a protected activity.38  When government chooses to support one 
activity over another, it is merely working within its operational 
authority.39  Further, the Rust Court ruled that the government has the 
 32 Id. at 192. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. at 192-93 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 
(1977)). 
 35 Id. at 193 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). 
 36 Id. at 194 (“Petitioners’ assertions ultimately boil down to the position that if the 
government chooses to subsidize one protected right, it must subsidize analogous counterpart rights.  
But the Court has soundly rejected that proposition.” (emphasis added)). 
 37 Id. at 193. 
 38 Id. 
 39 See id. at 179, 193-94. 
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authority to “define the limits” of programs it decides to support with 
public funds.40 
In Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia,41 
the Supreme Court expounded on the government-speech doctrine by 
giving the government power to make content-based decisions.  In that 
case, the Court found that denial of university funding for a student 
organization’s newspaper costs is not synonymous with government 
speech.42  The Court declared: 
[W]hen the State is the speaker, it may make content-based choices. 
When the University determines the content of the education it 
provides, it is the University speaking, and we have permitted the 
government to regulate the content of what is or is not expressed when 
it is the speaker or when it enlists private entities to convey its own 
message. . . .  When the government appropriates public funds to 
promote a particular policy of its own it is entitled to say what it 
wishes.  When the government disburses public funds to private 
entities to convey a governmental message, it may take legitimate and 
appropriate steps to ensure that its message is neither garbled nor 
distorted by the grantee.43 
The Supreme Court in Board of Regents of the University of 
Wisconsin System v. Southworth upheld the university’s student activity 
fee but found the government-speech doctrine inapplicable because the 
case did not involve speech by the University. In so holding, the Court 
described the government-speech doctrine as effectively empowering the 
government when it speaks.44  Specifically, the Court stated that in the 
course of its constitutional obligations, the government will have to 
implement policies and programs that its citizens will passionately 
disagree with.45  Further, the Court declared that, despite protests from 
the citizenry, the government could choose to promote those policies and 
programs “by taxes or other exactions.”46  The Court emphasized the 
inevitability that public funds will be expended on speech and other 
advocacy in the course of the government’s duties.47  The Court 
indicated that even though the government-speech doctrine immunizes 
 40 Id. at 194. 
 41 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995). 
 42 Id. at 841 (“In this case, ‘the government has not fostered or encouraged’ any mistaken 
impression that the student newspapers speak for the University.”). 
 43 Id. at 833. 
 44 Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 221, 229-35 (2000). 
 45 Id. at 229. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. 
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government action from First Amendment scrutiny, citizens are not 
without recourse.48  This recourse includes the election of government 
officials who will support programs and policies with which the citizenry 
agree.49 
Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez50 presented the Supreme Court 
with another opportunity to speak about the government-speech doctrine.  
The Court was faced with a First Amendment challenge to the 
congressionally created Legal Services Corporation (LSC) fund.51  This 
program barred fund recipients from legal representation in any case 
entailing a challenge to current welfare law.52  Finding the restriction 
unconstitutional,53 the Court distinguished the legal representation—
private speech—from government speech: 
[A]n LSC-funded attorney speaks on the behalf of the client in a claim 
against the government for welfare benefits.  The lawyer is not the 
government’s speaker.  The attorney defending the decision to deny 
benefits will deliver the government’s message in the litigation.  The 
LSC lawyer, however, speaks on the behalf of his or her private, 
indigent client.54 
The Court reaffirmed its support for the breadth of the government-
speech doctrine by reiterating that when the government is the speaker, it 
is authorized to make funding decisions that discriminate based on 
viewpoint.55 
In Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Ass’n,56 the Court provided the 
greatest insight since Rust on the government-speech doctrine.57  
Johanns involved a First Amendment challenge to a government 
campaign designed to encourage consumption and marketing of beef.58  
In that case, various beef producers challenged the use of a mandatory 
 48 Id. at 235. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001). 
 51 Id. at 536. 
 52 Id. at 536-37; see id. at 537 (“As interpreted by the LSC and by the Government, the 
restriction prevents an attorney from arguing to a court that a state statute conflicts with a federal 
statute or that either a state or federal statute by its terms or in its application is violative of the 
United States Constitution.”). 
 53 Id. at 548-49. 
 54 Id. at 542. 
 55 Id. at 541. 
 56 Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550 (2005). 
 57 See id. at 557 (“We have not heretofore considered the First Amendment consequences of 
government-compelled subsidy of the government’s own speech.”). 
 58 Id. at 553. 
9
Oluwole: Race Consciousness and Government Speech
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2013
402 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43 
 
assessment to fund the campaign.59  The Court was presented with the 
question of whether the campaign constituted government speech, thus 
immunizing the speech from First Amendment challenge.60  The Court 
found that the campaign constituted government speech and that the 
government can compel financial support of its own speech.61  In other 
words, the Constitution does not bar the government from compelling 
support of programs with which citizens disagree.62  The Court declared 
that it had “generally assumed, though not yet squarely held, that 
compelled funding of government speech does not alone raise First 
Amendment concerns.”63  The Court pointed out that some government 
programs, partially or entirely, constitute speech,64 as is the case with 
race-conscious measures. 
The Johanns Court ruled that in order to constitute government 
speech, the speech must be shown to be “effectively controlled” by the 
government.65  The Court revealed six factors critical to an assessment of 
whether speech is indeed “effectively controlled” by the government:66  
whether the government established the speech “from beginning to end”; 
whether the government “set out the overarching message” of the speech; 
if the government left the development of some details of the message to 
a non-government entity, whether members of that entity are answerable 
to the government; whether the government had “final approval authority 
over every word used”; whether the government reviewed the message 
“both for substance and for wording”; and whether the government was 
in attendance and participated in open meetings for the proposal’s or 
program’s development.67 
 59 Id. at 555. 
 60 Id. at 553. 
 61 Id. at 559-62. 
 62 Id. at 559. 
 63 Id. (emphasis added). 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. at 560. 
 66 Id. at 560-61. 
 67 Id.  This Article will refer to these factors as the Johanns index of control.  Prior to 
Johanns, several federal courts of appeals have applied a non-exclusive list of four factors to 
determine if speech was private or government speech: the central purpose of the program in which 
the speech in question occurs, the degree of editorial control exercised by the government or private 
entities over the content of the speech, the identity of the literal speaker, and whether the government 
or the private entity bears the ultimate responsibility for the content of the speech.  See, e.g., Arizona 
Life Coal. Inc., v. Stanton, 515 F.3d 956, 964 (9th Cir. 2008); Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. 
Comm’r of Va. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 288 F.3d 610, 618-19 (4th Cir. 2002); Knights of the Ku 
Klux Klan v. Curators of Univ. of Mo., 203 F.3d 1085, 1093–94 (8th Cir. 2000).  Given the Supreme 
Court’s introduction of the Johanns index of control, it is uncertain whether the pre-Johanns factors 
will have as critical a weight as they did before Johanns. 
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The Court ruled that if the government entity “sets the overall 
message to be communicated and approves every word that is 
disseminated, it is not precluded from relying on the government-speech 
doctrine merely because it solicits assistance from nongovernmental 
sources in developing specific messages.”68  Additionally, the Court 
stated that “[c]itizens may challenge compelled support of private 
speech, but have no First Amendment right not to fund government 
speech.  And that is no less true when the funding is achieved through 
targeted assessments devoted exclusively to the program to which the 
assessed citizens object.”69 
Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum,70 was the “first case in 
which the Court was unanimous in characterizing contested speech as the 
government’s.”71  In Summum, the issue before the Court was whether a 
private group could compel a government entity to place a permanent 
monument in a public park.72  The group sought to erect a monument 
featuring the Seven Aphorisms of Summum73 alongside other donated 
monuments, such as the Ten Commandments, that were already in the 
park.74  The Court held that permanent monuments in public parks were 
government speech.75 
The Court stated that the Free Speech Clause governs private 
speech, not government speech.76  Consequently, the government is free 
to control what it says and to “say what it wishes.”77  The Court noted 
that the government “has the right to speak for itself”78 and is free to 
“select the views that it wants to express.”79  Citing Justice Scalia’s 
opinion in a prior case,80 the Court iterated that “[i]t is the very business 
 68 Johanns, 544 U.S. at 562. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460 (2009). 
 71 Norton & Citron, supra note 5, at 913. 
 72 Summum, 555 U.S. at 464. 
 73 The Summum church believes that, while on Mount Sinai, Moses received the Seven 
Aphorisms (the Seven Principles of Creation) before receiving the Ten Commandments.  Id. at 465 
n.1.  However, Moses showed the Seven Aphorisms only to a few people, because of his belief that 
the Israelites were not prepared for the Aphorisms.  Id. 
 74 Id. at 464-65. 
 75 Id. at 464. 
 76 Id. at 467. 
 77 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of 
Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995)). 
 78 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. 
Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 229 (2000)). 
 79 Id. (citing Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194 (1991); Nat’l Endowment for Arts v. 
Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 598 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring)). 
 80 Finley, 524 U.S. at 598 (Scalia, J., concurring).  Specifically, Justice Scalia stated: 
11
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of government to favor and disfavor points of view.”81  Otherwise, as the 
Court explained, public debate and the government’s functioning would 
be compromised: 
If every citizen were to have a right to insist that no one paid by public 
funds express a view with which he disagreed, debate over issues of 
great concern to the public would be limited to those in the private 
sector, and the process of government as we know it radically 
transformed. . . .  A government entity may exercise this same 
freedom to express its views when it receives assistance from private 
sources for the purpose of delivering a government-controlled 
message.82 
The Court made plain that “[t]o govern, government has to say 
something, and a First Amendment heckler’s veto of any forced 
contribution to raising the government’s voice in the ‘marketplace of 
ideas’ would be out of the question.”83  As in Southworth, the Court 
emphasized that when the government speaks, this immunity from a First 
Amendment challenge does not protect government officials from 
electoral accountability.84  Citizens who do not like the government’s 
position may vote for different government representatives.85  As the 
Seventh Circuit later explicated, the “constraints on the government’s 
choice of message are primarily electoral, not judicial.”86 
It is the very business of government to favor and disfavor points of view on (in modern 
times, at least) innumerable subjects—which is the main reason we have decided to elect 
those who run the government, rather than save money by making their posts hereditary.  
And it makes not a bit of difference, insofar as either common sense or the Constitution is 
concerned, whether these officials further their (and, in a democracy, our) favored point of 
view by achieving it directly (having government-employed artists paint pictures, for 
example, or government-employed doctors perform abortions); or by advocating it officially 
(establishing an Office of Art Appreciation, for example, or an Office of Voluntary 
Population Control); or by giving money to others who achieve or advocate it (funding 
private art classes, for example, or Planned Parenthood).  None of this has anything to do 
with abridging anyone’s speech. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
 81 Summum, 555 U.S. at 468 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 82 Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (quoting Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 
496 U.S. 1, 12–13 (1990)). 
 83 Id. at 468 (some internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. 
Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 574 (2005) (Souter, J., dissenting)). 
 84 Id. at 468-69. 
 85 Id. 
 86 Choose Life Ill., Inc. v. White, 547 F.3d 853, 859 (7th Cir. 2008). 
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Various lower courts have applied the government-speech 
doctrine.87  Professor Andy Olree notes that “in freedom of speech cases, 
lower courts have accepted the Rust-inspired government-speech 
doctrine and seem to be aware that when the government has a message 
to send, such a message need not be viewpoint-neutral, and other 
messages need not receive governmental support.”88  For example, in 
Downs v. Los Angeles Unified School District, a public school teacher 
challenged the school district’s use of school bulletin boards to 
commemorate Gay and Lesbian Awareness month.89  The teacher 
disagreed with such commemoration and sought to post his responses to 
the commemorative postings.90  The issue before the Ninth Circuit was 
“whether the First Amendment compels a public high school to share the 
podium with a teacher with antagonistic and contrary views when the 
school speaks to its own constituents on the subject of how students 
should behave towards each other while in school.”91  The court 
characterized the bulletin boards as government speech, noting that this 
is “an example of the government opening up its own mouth.”92  The 
court emphasized that the school exercised final authority over the 
content of the bulletin boards.93  Furthermore, the court declared that 
“[s]imply because the government opens its mouth to speak does not 
give every outside individual or group a First Amendment right to play 
ventriloquist.”94 
The Downs court held that 
when a public high school is the speaker, its control of its own speech 
is not subject to the constraints of constitutional safeguards and forum 
analysis, but instead is measured by practical considerations 
applicable to any individual’s choice of how to convey oneself: among 
other things, content, timing, and purpose.95 
 87 See, e.g., Sutliffe v. Epping Sch. Dist., 584 F.3d 314, 330 (1st Cir. 2009) (“Summum 
makes it clear that when the government uses its discretion to select between the speech of third 
parties for presentation through communication channels owned by the government and used for 
government speech, this in itself may constitute an expressive act by the government that is 
independent of the message of the third-party speech.”); Chiras v. Miller, 432 F.3d 606, 616-19 (5th 
Cir. 2005) (finding state selection and use of textbooks is government speech). 
 88 Olree, supra note 14, at 379. 
 89 Downs v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1003, 1005-08 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. at 1005. 
 92 Id. at 1012-13. 
 93 Id. at 1011-13. 
 94 Id. at 1013. 
 95 Id. 
13
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on air: 
 
The court ruled that a school district is free to “decide not only to talk 
about gay and lesbian awareness and tolerance in general, but also to 
advocate such tolerance if it so decides, and restrict the contrary speech 
of one of its representatives.”96  The court reasoned that citizens seeking 
to convey a viewpoint contrary to the school district’s can speak at the 
ballot box by electing new school board members.97 
The Eighth Circuit had the opportunity to apply the government-
speech doctrine in Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Curators of the 
University of Missouri.98  The Curators of the University of Missouri 
implemented an underwriting program designed to fund the university’s 
public radio station.99  Federal law required that public radio stations 
acknowledge on air any source of funding for their broadcasts.100  Under 
the funding program, a donor could get an enhanced acknowledgment in 
a fifteen-second message drafted by the radio station’s staff or the 
donor.101  The Ku Klux Klan asked the radio station if it could 
underwrite four segments of one of the station’s broadcasts, National 
Public Radio’s “All Things Considered.”102  The Ku Klux Klan proposed 
that the following acknowledgement be read 
The Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, a White Christian organization, 
standing up for rights and values of White Christian America since 
1865.  For more information[,] please contact the Knights of the Ku 
Klux Klan, at . . . .  Let your voice be heard!103 
The radio station rejected the Ku Klux Klan’s request to underwrite its 
program, prompting the Klan to file suit challenging the decision as a 
violation of the First Amendment.104 
The court ruled that acknowledgments read on air constituted 
government speech as the radio station had final authority and editorial 
control over the contents.105  The court held that when the government 
 96 Id. at 1014; see also id. at 1015 (“Were we to invoke the Constitution to protect Downs’s 
ability to make his voice a part of the voice of the government entity he served, Downs would be 
able to do to the government what the government could not do to Downs: compel it to embrace a 
viewpoint.”). 
 97 Id. at 1016. 
 98 Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Curators of Univ. of Mo., 203 F.3d 1085 (8th Cir. 2000). 
 99 Id. at 1088. 
 100 Id. 
 101 Id. 
 102 Id. at 1089. 
 103 Id. 
 104 Id. at 1090. 
 105 Id. at 1093–94.  Additionally, the court pointed out that the underwriting program’s central 
purpose was not to support the views of the donors, but to “acknowledge any money, service, or 
14
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conveys a message over which it has editorial control and final authority, 
the message is government speech, even if private individuals or entities 
are involved in the speech.106 
The Sixth Circuit has described the government-speech doctrine as 
follows: 
Government can certainly speak out on public issues supported by a 
broad consensus, even though individuals have a First Amendment 
right not to express agreement.  For instance, government can 
distribute pins that say “Register and Vote,” issue postage stamps 
during World War II that say “Win the War,” and sell license plates 
that say “Spay or Neuter your Pets.”  Citizens clearly have the First 
Amendment right to oppose such widely-accepted views, but that right 
cannot conceivably require the government to distribute “Don’t Vote” 
pins, to issue postage stamps in 1942 that say “Stop the War,” or to 
sell license plates that say “Spaying or Neutering your Pet is 
107
The Fifth Circuit has specifically extended the government-speech 
doctrine to public schools, noting that “the government, including its 
educational institutions, has the discretion to promote policies and values 
of its own choosing free from forum analysis or the viewpoint-neutrality 
requirement.”108  The court maintained that the government’s discretion 
encompasses cases in which private messengers are used to convey the 
other valuable consideration directly or indirectly paid, or promised to or charged or accepted by the 
station with respect to the broadcast of any matter.”  Id. at 1093 (internal quotation marks and 
f authority indicates that government speech 
ay sa
ed). 
as v. Miller, 432 F.3d 606, 613 (5th Cir. 2005) (emphasis added). 
ellipsis omitted). 
 106 Id. at 1094.  This is very similar to the Tenth Circuit’s determination in Wells v. City and 
County of Denver that “[w]hen the government speaks, either directly or through private 
intermediaries, it is constitutionally entitled to make content-based choices, and to engage in 
viewpoint-based funding decisions.”  Wells v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 257 F.3d 1132, 1139 (10th 
Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors 
of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995); Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 541 
(2001)); see also Page v. Lexington Cnty. Sch. Dist. One, C.A. No. 3:06-249-CMC, 2007 WL 
2123784, at *6 (D. S.C. 2007) (“It is, however, clear that the government may speak through third 
parties and that such speech will be deemed government speech even though drafted and presented 
by a third-party at least when: (1) the government determines an overarching message; and (2) 
approves every word disseminated at its behest.” (citing Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 
550, 561 (2005)).  The Tenth Circuit ruled that “[t]he First Amendment does prohibit the 
suppression of unpopular speech because of its content, but it does not require the government to 
serve as a speaker’s proxy or bodyguard in order to enhance the strength of the speaker’s message in 
the marketplace of ideas.”  Wells, 257 F.3d at 1149; see also Newton v. LePage, 789 F. Supp. 2d 
172, 192 (D. Me. 2011) (“[T]he overwhelming weight o
m y what it wishes regardless of viewpoint . . . .”).  
 107 ACLU v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370, 379 (6th Cir. 2006) (footnotes omitt
 108 Chir
15
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t the social milieu or to persuade 
peop
government speech.109  The United States District Court for the District 
of South Carolina expanded on the Fifth Circuit’s government-speech 
approach, stating that “[t]he underlying justification is that the 
government has ‘exercise[d] editorial judgment in choosing 
te speakers to facilitate the government’s own message.’”110 
The above cases make clear that when the government speaks, it has 
“rights that are in many ways coextensive with the rights that private 
speakers enjoy under the First Amendment.”111  Those rights include the 
“government’s exclusion of unwelcomed speech in the time, place, and 
space of government speech activity.”112  Given that the government 
already speaks on various “contested social and political issues,”113 the 
government should not shy away from speech that relies on race-
conscious measures to encourage diversity in the public schools.  After 
all, “[e]ducation is widely understood to be a primary way in which 
government inculcates values in its citizens.”114  As Professor Carter 
admonishes, “[t]he Court should not lightly disregard the judgment of 
democratically accountable actors that race consciousness s
ins necessary to overcome persistent racial inequality.”115 
When the government-speech doctrine is invoked, “private speakers 
lose their First Amendment claim not because the Court views the 
private speakers’ expressive claims as weak, but rather because the Court 
views the government’s competing expressive interests as stronger.”116  
With the Court viewing the government’s interests as relatively stronger 
than that of private speakers, the government has a unique and “valuable 
opportunity to influence social meanings and affect norms of conduct”117 
through mechanisms such as public-school admissions policies.  In fact, 
since schools have a tutelary relation with students and a responsibility to 
instill values in students, it is particularly critical that they be able to 
express “viewpoints designed to affec
le to think and act differently.”118 
The government-speech doctrine is very potent because “[o]nce a 
court determines that the government has adopted the speech as its own, 
 
 109 Id. 
 110 Page, 2007 WL 2123784, at *6 (quoting Chiras, 432 F.3d at 613). 
 111 Steven G. Gey, Why Should the First Amendment Protect Government Speech when the 
Government Has Nothing To Say?, 95 IOWA L. REV. 1259, 1268 (2010). 
 112 Bezanson, supra note 21, at 809. 
 113 Taylor, supra note 19, at 1121. 
 114 Id. at 1156. 
 115 Carter, supra note 6, at 8-9. 
 116 Gey, supra note 111, at 1262. 
 117 Taylor, supra note 19, at 1121. 
 118 Olree, supra note 14, at 367-68. 
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and develop our children into responsible, tolerant citizens 
so t
educ
ework courts have traditionally used to review challenges to 
school districts’ race-conscious measures under the Equal Protection 
II.  T
 
then only one conclusion could follow from everything the Court has 
said about the new doctrine of government speech: the government will 
win, and the private speaker will lose.”119  The government-speech 
doctrine permits “what had previously been thought forbidden: the 
burdening, even if not silencing, of private viewpoints because the 
government disagrees with them.”120  This potency of the government-
speech doctrine will prove particularly helpful to schools seeking to 
instill values 
hat schools do not become breeding grounds for viewpoint 
litigation.121 
The government-speech doctrine is a powerful weapon for 
defending race-conscious measures designed to further diversity in 
schools.  This is particularly so because the doctrine gives immunity and 
thus judicial deference to the government when it speaks.  Accordingly, 
the doctrine may give schools an opening to establish race-conscious 
measures that will withstand legal challenges.  With this opportunity to 
promote benign race-conscious positions, resegregation of public schools 
may be reversed, and children might have ample opportunities for 
ation in diverse schools and classrooms.  Further, the post-racial 
society of which many have dreamed and advocated may yet be realized. 
The Equal Protection Clause strict-scrutiny test has served as an 
impediment to the realization of those dreams.  The next Part describes 
the fram
Clause. 
HE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE REVIEW FRAMEWORK 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
provides that “No State shall . . . deny to any person within its 
 119 Gey, supra note 111, at 1303.  See generally Nelda H. Cambron-McCabe, When 
Government Speaks: An Examination of the Evolving Government Speech Doctrine, 274 EDUC. L. 
EP. 7
tent, so long as in so doing it is expressing its own viewpoint.” (internal 
’s message. But they cannot express that disagreement in their 
refer
R 53 (2012). 
 120 Blocher, supra note 18, at 697; see also id. at 696 (“[P]ursuant to government speech 
doctrine, the government may be able to restrict private expression because of its message, its ideas, 
its subject matter, or its con
quotation marks omitted)). 
 121 Blocher gives a very incisive perspective on the potency of the government speech 
doctrine: “[O]nce the government is speaking, speakers cannot assert any First Amendment claim to 
stop it from doing so, nor do they have a First Amendment right to oppose the government’s speech 
by whatever method they choose.  Of course, private speakers remain free to agree or disagree with 
the content of the government
p red way . . . .”  Id. at 711. 
17
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 ways: if the classification infringes upon a 
fund
clude the rights to interstate travel,  procreation and 
marr
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”122  Courts have 
traditionally used a three-tier framework for reviewing Equal Protection 
claims.  The tiers are strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, and rational 
basis.123  Government classifications of a group of people can trigger 
strict scrutiny in either of two
amental right,124 or if the government discriminates against a 
member of a suspect class.125 
Courts determine whether a right is “fundamental” by examining 
whether it is implicitly or explicitly guaranteed by the United States 
Constitution.126  Rights the Supreme Court has accorded fundamental-
rights status in 127
iage,128 vote in federal and state elections,129 privacy,130 and free 
association.131 
To determine if a classification is suspect, a court examines the facts 
of the case for the “traditional indicia of suspectness.”132  The indicia 
 
 122 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 123 See JOSEPH OLUWOLE, THE SUPREME COURT AND WHISTLEBLOWERS: TEACHERS AND 
OTHER PUBLIC EMPLOYEES 135-50 (2008) (discussing the history of the Equal Protection Clause 
jurisprudence). 
 124 Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450, 457-58 (1988); see also Shapiro v. 
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 658 (1969), overruled in part on other grounds by Edelman v. Jordan, 415 
U.S. 651 (1974). 
 125 Kadrmas, 487 U.S. at 457; see also Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 658 (suspect classifications 
involve “racial classifications, which have . . . been regarded as inherently ‘suspect’”); Korematsu v. 
United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (“[A]ll legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a 
single racial group are immediately suspect. . . .  [C]ourts must subject them to the most rigid 
scrutiny.”). 
 126 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33 (1973) (“It is not the province 
of this Court to create substantive constitutional rights in the name of guaranteeing equal protection 
of the laws.  Thus, the key to discovering whether education is ‘fundamental’ is not to be found in 
comparisons of the relative societal significance of education as opposed to subsistence or housing.  
Nor is it to be found by weighing whether education is as important as the right to travel.  Rather, the 
answer lies in assessing whether there is a right to education explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by 
the Constitution.”). 
 127 See, e.g., id. at 32 (“The right to interstate travel had long been recognized as a right of 
constitutional significance.”); Attorney Gen. of N.Y. v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 904 n.4 (1986) 
(“[R]egardless of the label we place on our analysis-right to migrate or equal protection-once we 
find a burden on the right to migrate the standard of review is the same.  Laws which burden that 
right must be necessary to further a compelling state interest.”). 
 128 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 385 
(1978). 
 129 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886); Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 
395 U.S. 621, 626 (1969); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964).  Note that Sailors v. Bd. 
of Educ., 387 U.S. 105 (1967), ruled that there is no fundamental right to vote in local elections.  Id. 
at 108-11. 
 130 Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). 
 131 NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 466 (1958). 
 132 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973). 
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mand extraordinary 
prote





include whether the class is “saddled with such disabilities, or subjected 
to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a 
position of political powerlessness as to com
ction from the majoritarian political process.”133  To date, the 
United States Supreme Court has recognized only three classes as 
suspect: race,134 alienage,135 and national origin.136 
Under the strict-scrutiny test, the government be
f.137  The test requires the government to prove that it has a 
compelling reason for the classification138 and that the classification is 
narrowly tailored to achieve the compelling reason.139 
Persons challenging government classifications seek strict scrutiny 
because the “compelling” reason and “narrow tailoring” requirements are 
very difficult to meet.140  Even when the government shows that it has a 
compelling reason for the classification, it might not be able to show that 
the classification is narrowly tailored to achieve the compelling 
reason.141  Narrow-tailoring jurisprudence often concludes that there are 
less restrictive means for achieving the compelling reasons tha
rnment’s chosen classification.142  Moreover, when strict scrutiny 
applies, courts presume the classification is unconstitutional, and the 
government must overcome that presumption in order to prevail.143 
 133 Id. 
 134 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 214-16 (1995); Loving v. Virginia, 388 
.S. 1
est by the least 
stric
“We put the burden on state actors to demonstrate that their race-based policies are 
al 
t 726 (2007); Tuttle v. Arlington Cnty. Sch. Bd., 
95 F
ch., 197 F.3d 123, 131-32 (4th Cir. 1999); Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 
90, 8
vely 
ification.”); Eisenberg, 197 F.3d at 128-29. 
U , 11 (1967). 
 135 Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 219-20 (1984) (“As a general matter, a state law that 
discriminates on the basis of alienage can be sustained only if it can withstand strict judicial scrutiny.  
In order to withstand strict scrutiny, the law must advance a compelling state inter
re tive means available.”); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971). 
 136 Graham, 403 U.S. at 371-72; Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 644-46 (1948). 
 137 Parents Involved IV, 551 U.S. 701, 720 (2007); Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 506 
n.1 (2005) (
justified.”). 
 138 Parents Involved IV, 551 U.S. at 720; Johnson, 543 U.S. at 505. 
 139 Parents Involved IV, 551 U.S. at 720; Johnson, 543 U.S. at 505. 
 140 Brant K. Brown, Note, Scrutinizing Juvenile Curfews: Constitutional Standards & the 
Fundamental Rights of Juveniles & Parents, 53 VAND. L. REV. 653, 667 (2000) (“[W]hile ration
basis is, in practice, almost a standard of per se legality, strict scrutiny is difficult to overcome.”). 
 141 See, e.g., Parents Involved IV, 551 U.S. a
1 .3d 698, 705-07 (4th Cir. 1999) (per curiam). 
 142 See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 507-08 (1989); Eisenberg v. 
Montgomery Cnty. Pub. S
7 07 (1st Cir. 1998). 
 143 See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216-17 (1982); Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 
U.S. 256, 272 (1979) (“[R]acial classification, regardless of purported motivation, is presumpti
invalid and can be upheld only on extraordinary just
19
Oluwole: Race Consciousness and Government Speech
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2013
412 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43 
tant reason for the classification and that the 
class
re presumed constitutional, 
with
related to a legitimate government interest.  
 
Government classifications that discriminate against quasi-suspect 
classes attract the intermediate-scrutiny standard of review.144  The name 
of the standard comes from the fact that it is the intermediate level of 
review between strict scrutiny and rational basis.145  Government 
classifications subject to intermediate scrutiny confront a presumption of 
unconstitutionality, similar to that with strict scrutiny.146  To overcome 
this presumption, the intermediate-scrutiny test requires the government 
to show that it has an impor
ification is substantially related to the important government 
interest.147  The Court has recognized only gender148 and illegitimacy149 
as quasi-suspect classes.150 
The most lenient of the three standards of review for government 
classifications is rational-basis review.151  Rational-basis review is 
“minimal scrutiny in theory and virtually none in fact.”152  
Classifications that qualify for rational basis a
 the burden on the plaintiff to prove otherwise.153  The rational-basis 
test requires the plaintiff to prove that the classification is not rationally 
154
 144 Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988). 
 145 Id. 
 146 See Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 538 (1973) (“We therefore hold that once a State posits 
a judicially enforceable right on behalf of children to needed support from their natural fathers there 
is no constitutionally sufficient justification for denying such an essential right to a child simply 
because its natural father has not married its mother.”); J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 152 (1994) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (“And though the intermediate scrutiny test we have applied may not 
provide a very clear standard in all instances . . . our case law does reveal a strong presumption that 
ende
es referred to 
y 
18, 723-24 (1982); Boren, 429 U.S. at 197. 
s a Court To Do Post-McDonald?, 21 CORNELL J.L. & 
UB. P
t Deny 
ubsis 47, 1548 (1984) (“Rationality scrutiny . . . is a much more 
atute can easily pass constitutional muster.”). 
lause affirmatively supports the application 
g r classifications are invalid.”); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 61 
(1973) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 147 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).  The Supreme Court has sometim
the intermediate-scrutiny test as a requirement that the government provide an “exceedingl
persuasive justification.”  See, e.g., Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 461 (1981). 
 148 Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 7
 149 Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988); see also Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 537-538 
(1973); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71-72 (1968). 
 150 Harvey v. Mich. Dep’t of Mgmt. & Budget, Bureau of Ret. Servs., 664 N.W.2d 767, 772-
73 (Mich. 2003) (“[T]he United States Supreme Court has applied the intermediate scrutiny test only 
to challenges involving quasi-suspect classes such as gender and illegitimacy.”); Stacey L. Sobel, 
The Tsunami of Legal Uncertainty: What’
P OL’Y 489, 495 (2012) (“The Supreme Court reserved intermediate scrutiny for discrimination 
on the bases of gender and illegitimacy.”). 
 151 See Comment, Intermediate Equal Protection Scrutiny of Welfare Laws Tha
S tence, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 15
deferential standard of review under which a st
 152 Gunther, supra note 3, at 8. 
 153 Comment, supra note 151, at 1567. 
 154 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28, 40 (1973) (“A century of 
Supreme Court adjudication under the Equal Protection C
20
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mpossible standard of 
review.   The Supreme Court has indicated that both beneficial and 
invi
ords, such classifications are constitutional 
only if they are narrowly tailored measures that further compelling 
 of 
race,
ch approach to benign use of race in public schools, 
the next Part presents a summary of the facts and procedural history of 
III.  SYNOPSIS OF THE JOURNEY OF THE PARENTS INVOLVED CASE TO THE 
 
Given that race is a suspect classification, race-conscious measures 
fall under strict scrutiny, presenting school districts seeking to promote 
diversity with a very difficult and sometimes i
155
dious uses of race trigger strict scrutiny: 
all governmental action based on race—a group classification long 
recognized as in most circumstances irrelevant and therefore 
prohibited—should be subjected to detailed judicial inquiry to ensure 
that the personal right to equal protection of the laws has not been 
infringed.  These ideas have long been central to this Court’s 
understanding of equal protection, and holding benign state and 
federal racial classifications to different standards does not square 
with them.  A free people whose institutions are founded upon the 
doctrine of equality should tolerate no retreat from the principle that 
government may treat people differently because of their race only for 
the most compelling reasons.  Accordingly, we hold today that all 
racial classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or local 
governmental actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court under 
strict scrutiny.  In other w
governmental interests.156 
Given the Supreme Court’s equally stringent approach to benign use
 it is time to consider a new approach.  Benign racial classifications 
should be framed—and therefore, protected—as government speech. 




In Parents Involved, the United States Supreme Court consolidated 
two cases to consider whether public schools can voluntarily use race-
conscious measures to assign students to schools.157  In one of the 
o  traditional standard of review, which requiref the s only that the State’s system be shown to bear 
me r
companying text. 
1995) (internal quotation marks, 
.S. 701, 710-11 (2007). 
so ational relationship to legitimate state purposes.”) 
 155 See supra note 3 and ac
 156 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (
brackets, and citations omitted). 
 157 Parents Involved IV, 551 U
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 on behalf of “parents 
of ch
like school districts under court-ordered desegregation, 
Seatt
 
cases,158 the plaintiff nonprofit Parents Involved in Community School 
sued in federal district court to challenge Seattle School District No. 1’s 
use of racial tiebreakers for student assignments to its high schools.159  
The Equal Protection Clause challenge was brought
ildren who have been or may be denied assignment to their chosen 
high school in the district because of their race.”160 
Seattle School District No. 1 considered an applicant’s race as well 
as the impact on racial balance of a school’s racial demographics in 
student assignments.161  The racial tiebreaker categorized students into 
one of two racial groups: white or nonwhite.162  The district’s overall 
racial demographics provided the baseline;163 approximately fifty-nine 
percent of the students in the district were nonwhite and forty-one 
percent white.164  If a school’s racial demographic varied ten percent 
above or below this baseline, the school was deemed racially 
imbalanced.165  Specifically, “[i]f an oversubscribed school is not within 
10 percentage points of the district’s overall white/nonwhite racial 
balance, it is what the district calls ‘integration positive,’ and the district 
employs a tiebreaker that selects for assignment students whose race will 
serve to bring the school into balance.”166  As the Supreme Court later 
pointed out, un
le’s plan was not a response to a history of district-sanctioned 
segregation.167 
The district court held that the racial tiebreaker passed constitutional 
muster under the strict-scrutiny standard of review.168  A panel of the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit disagreed.169  The 
panel ruled that the school district had compelling reasons for its racial 
tiebreaker program: interests in student diversity and in avoiding racial 
 158 Parents Involved in Cmty Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 (Parents Involved I), 137 F. 
 
nvolved I, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 1226. 
chools—legally separate schools for students 
f diff
Parents Involved II), 377 F.3d 
49, 98 4) (“Its racial tiebreaker . . . plainly fails the narrow tailoring component of the 
crutiny test.”). 
Supp. 2d 1224 (W.D. Wash. 2001). 
 159 Id. at 1225-26. 
 160 Parents Involved IV, 551 U.S. at 713; see also Parents I
 161 Parents Involved I, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 1226. 
 162 Parents Involved IV, 551 U.S. at 723. 
 163 Parents Involved I, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 1226. 
 164 Parents Involved IV, 551 U.S. at 712. 
 165 Parents Involved I, F. Supp. 2d at 1226 n.2; Parents Involved IV, 551 U.S. at 712. 
 166 Parents Involved IV, 551 U.S. at 712 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 167 Id. (“Seattle has never operated segregated s
o erent races—nor has it ever been subject to court-ordered desegregation.”). 
 168 Parents Involved I, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 1240. 
 169 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 (
9 0 (9th Cir. 200
Constitution’s strict s
22
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  The Ninth Circuit 
gran
 under the Equal Protection Clause after her 
son, 




isolation of its students.170  The panel, however, found the tiebreaker was 
not narrowly tailored to achieve those interests.171
ted rehearing en banc and reversed the panel, specifically ruling that 
the tiebreaker was narrowly tailored to achieve the compelling 
interests.172 
In the second of the consolidated cases, McFarland v. Jefferson 
County Public Schools,173 Crystal Meredith, among other plaintiffs, 
challenged Jefferson County Public Schools’ use of a race-conscious 
student assignment program
Joshua McDonald, was denied a transfer to his school of 
preference.174  The transfer was denied because it would have negatively 
impacted racial balance.175 
The district’s voluntary race-conscious student-assignment plan 
sought to increase black student enrollment at each of its non-magnet 
elementary schools to “at least 15% and no more than 50%” of the 
school’s student population.176  While 
e district’s students were black, most of the remaining sixty-six 
percent were white.177  The district’s plan classified students into one of 
two racial categories: black or other.178 
The Supreme Court later pointed out that while there was a history 
of segregated schools in Jefferson County Public Schools, the district had 
attained unitary status in 2000.179  Despite attaining unitary status, the 
district chose to implement the voluntary race-conscious plan so that the 
benefits it gained while under a desegregation decree would not be 
reversed.180  The district court ruled that the school district had a 
compelling interest in racial diversity that justified its 
 170 Id. at 964. 
 171 Id. at 980. 




volved IV, 551 U.S. 701, 717 (2007). 
I, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 837 n.3; see also Parents Involved IV, 551 U.S. at 717. 
ed unitary status).  Unitary status is attained 
ol system.  See Joseph O. Oluwole & Preston C. 
reen, isions and Parents Involved, 61 ARK. L. REV. 1, 
5 (20
1 66, 1172 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
 173 McFarland v. Jefferson Cnty. Pub. Sch. (McFarland I), 330 F. Supp. 2d 834 (W.D. K
2 . 
 174 Id. at 836, 837 n.3; see also Parents In
 175 McFarland 
 176 McFarland I, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 842 (“This reflects a broad range equally above and 
below Black student enrollment systemwide.”). 
 177 Id. at 840. 
 178 Parents Involved IV, 551 U.S. at 723; McFarland I, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 840 n.6. 
 179 Parents Involved IV, 551 U.S. at 715-16  (noting the procedural history leading to the 
district court’s finding that Jefferson County had attain
when a district no longer runs a dual segregated scho
G  III, Charter Schools: Racial-Balancing Prov
1 08). 
 180 McFarland I, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 841-42. 
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plan 
was ilored to achieve the compelling interest.   The United 
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.183 
uld 
elim
assignment plan.181  Additionally, the district court ruled that the 
narrowly ta 182
IV.  GOVERNMENT-SPEECH DOCTRINE AND THE PARENTS INVOLVED 
DECISION 
This Part examines the Parents Involved decision for support to 
characterize voluntary race-conscious student-assignment plans as 
government speech.  The Justices in Parents Involved184 recognized the 
legitimacy of some education policy goals or positions that could support 
use of race-conscious measures.  Accordingly, Parents Involved offers 
support that race-conscious policies could be protected under the 
government-speech doctrine.  By replacing the traditional Equal 
Protection Clause framework, the government-speech doctrine wo
inate the requirement that race-conscious programs be narrowly 
tailored to the government’s compelling interest in diverse educational 
settings.  Without the narrow-tailoring requirement, the assignment plans 
at issue in Parents Involved would have been found constitutional.185 
While the Justices analyzed the Parents Involved case under the 
Equal Protection Clause, nuances of the government-speech doctrine can 
be found in the Justices’ compelling-interest analysis.  Chief Justice 
Roberts, writing for the Court, recognized two compelling policy goals 
or positions for race-conscious assignment plans, interests that embody 
government messages.186  First is the remedial interest: if the government 
has intentionally sent a message that some races are inferior or superior, 
it can change its message through race-conscious measures designed to 
correct the vestiges of that past intentional discrimination.187  The Court 
 
 181 Parents Involved IV, 551 U.S. at 717-18. 
nt and wrote a separate opinion.  Id. at 782.  Justice 
reyer vens, Ginsburg, and Souter, and Justice 
ight assert, it suffices to note that our prior cases, in 
20 (citing Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 494 (1992)); see also id. at 793-96 
ennedy  (discussing remedial programs designed to remedy past intentional 
iscrim
 182 Id. 
 183 McFarland v. Jefferson Cnty. Pub. Sch. (McFarland II), 416 F.3d 513, 514 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 184 Chief Justice Roberts wrote the plurality opinion, and Justices Alito, Thomas, and Scalia 
joined that opinion.  Parents Involved IV, 551 U.S. at 708.  Justice Kennedy—the swing vote in 
Parents Involved IV—concurred in the judgme
B  wrote a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Ste
Stevens wrote a brief dissent.  Id. at 798, 803. 
 185 See infra notes 198, 200 and accompanying text. 
 186 Parents Involved IV, 551 U.S. at 720-22.  The Court appeared to indicate that it is open to 
adding other compelling interests in the future.  See id. at 720 (“Without attempting in these cases to 
set forth all the interests a school district m
evaluating the use of racial classifications in the school context, have recognized two interests that 
qualify as compelling.” (emphasis added)). 
 187 Id. at 7
(K , J., concurring)
d ination). 
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tained unitary status in 2000.   As 
for S
ast, it had tied its 
appr
on for the plans.   The 
distr
 
found that Jefferson County Public Schools did not act with a remedial 
purpose, because the district had at 188
eattle School District No. 1, the Court concluded that since the 
district had never officially sanctioned a message of racial 
discrimination, its race-conscious plan was not remedial.189  The Court 
stated that, for both school districts, the “use of race must be justified on 
some other basis” than remedial.190 
A second policy goal or position the Court recognized was diversity 
in higher education.191  The Court noted that an acceptable policy would 
not focus solely on race; rather, diversity must include a broad range of 
factors such as viewpoints, ideas, and culture that could add to student 
diversity.192  In fact, the Court noted that, in the p
oval of race-conscious measures designed to achieve diversity in 
higher education to speech.193  In essence, the Court itself has associated 
race-conscious measures with speech.  Justice Kennedy indicated, in his 
concurrence, that diversity could be a compelling interest at the 
elementary and secondary education levels as well.194 
Seattle and Jefferson County sought to convey through their plans 
that their schools were not racially concentrated and that they favored 
racial integration.195  The Parents Involved plurality rejected the 
districts’ focus on racial integration as justificati 196
icts also contended that they sought to provide students, through 
their plans, the benefits of socializing with other races.197  The plurality 
rejected this message of socialization as justification for the plans, under 
the narrow-tailoring requirement, because the plans were tied to racial 
diversity rather the broader diversity referenced above.198 
 188 Id. at 720-21. 
ght of the 
ote his concurring opinion 
ty of Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Scalia, and 
hom nt authored by Justice Breyer.  See id. at 782-83. 
lurality opinion). 
]he racial classifications employed by the districts are not narrowly tailored 
 the g the educational and social benefits asserted to flow from racial diversity.”). 
 189 Parents Involved IV, 551 U.S. at 720. 
 190 Id. at 721. 
 191 Id. at 722 (citing Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003)). 
 192 Id. at 722-23, 726. 
 193 See id. at 724 (“In upholding the [race-conscious] admissions plan in Grutter, though, this 
Court relied upon considerations unique to institutions of higher education, noting that in li
expansive freedoms of speech and thought associated with the university environment, universities 
occupy a special niche in our constitutional tradition.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 194 See id. at 791-93 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  Justice Kennedy wr
to discuss his disagreement with the plurali
T as, and the disse
 195 Id. at 725-26 (p
 196 Id. at 726. 
 197 Id. at 725-26. 
 198 Id. at 726 (“[T
to goal of achievin
25
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alia, Justice Thomas, and Justice Alito—indicated that 
cons
for imposing a 
racia
s plans convey messages of “racial 
The districts sought to increase the visibility of minorities and 
discourage racial isolation.199  The plurality similarly rejected this policy 
under its narrow-tailoring analysis because the messages relied on racial 
diversity rather than broader diversity.200  The plurality—Chief Justice 
Roberts, Justice Sc
titutionally permissible policies must regard people as individuals 
rather than mere members of a racial group; in other words, the 
government position or policy goal must further individuality rather than 
racial group affiliation.201  Further, the plurality admonished that race, 
and its relevance to governmental decisionmaking, should be 
deemphasized.202 
The plurality noted that while districts may design their plans to 
remedy past intentional discrimination,203 they cannot rely on the goal of 
redressing past general societal discrimination.204  The plurality reasoned 
that societal discrimination is “too amorphous a basis 
lly classified remedy.”205  Consequently, the plurality of Justices 
ruled that remedying societal discrimination does not constitute a 
compelling interest.206  Moreover, they stated that a “governmental 
agency’s interest in remedying societal discrimination, that is, 
discrimination not traceable to its own actions, cannot be deemed 
sufficiently compelling to pass constitutional muster.”207 
The plurality of Justices opined that even benign use of race is 
costly and conveys an “odious” message to “a free people whose 
institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality.”208  According to 
the plurality, voluntary race-consciou
 
 199 Id. at 727-28. 
 200 Id. at 726. 
 201 Id. at 730 (“[T]he Government must treat citizens as individuals, not as simply 
components of a racial, religious, sexual or national class.”). 
 202 Id. at 730-31.  The plurality reasoned that “[a]llowing racial balancing as a compelling end 
in itself would effectively assure that race will alwa
u goal of eliminat
ys be relevant in American life, and that the 
ltima ing entirely from governmental decisionmaking such irrelevant factors as a 
uman will never be achieved.”  Id. at 730 (internal quotation marks and brackets 
mitte
.S. 267, 276 (1986) (plurality 
pinio
-32 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Wygant, 476 U.S. at 288 
’Co , concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)). 
, 515 U.S. 200, 214 (1995)). 
te 
h  being’s race 
o d) (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 495 (1989) (plurality 
opinion)). 
 203 Id. at 720-21. 
 204 Id. at 731. 
 205 Id. (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U
o n)). 
 206 Id. (citing Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 909–10 (1996)). 
 207 Id. at 731
(O nnor, J.
 208 Id. at 745-46 (citing Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña
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infer
under the government-speech doctrine, they could opt to carve 
out a
 
iority” and “racial hostility.”209  Writing for the plurality, Chief 
Justice Roberts stated that such plans send a message to citizens that their 
government “demeans the dignity and worth of a person.”210  
Additionally, the plurality opined that the plans “reinforce the belief, 
held by too many for too much of our history, that individuals should be 
judged by the color of their skin.”211 
Unfortunately, the plurality attached no constitutional difference to 
the messages sent through invidious and benign uses of race.212  In other 
words, it makes no difference whether a race-conscious plan promotes 
racial integration or racial resegregation, racial hostility or race harmony, 
racial isolation or avoidance of racial isolation, visibility of minorities or 
invisibility of minorities, racial inclusion or racial exclusion; the plurality 
rejects these messages simply because they are race-conscious.  It is 
likely from the plurality opinion that Justices Alito, Scalia, Thomas, and 
Chief Justice Roberts would not be amenable to reviewing race-
conscious student-assignment plans under the government-speech 
doctrine, particularly because of the broad immunity the doctrine affords 
government speech.  Given their aversion to benign and invidious race-
conscious plans alike, if these Justices choose to review race-conscious 
measures 
n exception to the doctrine for race-conscious measures.  Under 
such a scenario, the Justices would concede that voluntary race-
conscious measures constitute government speech, while nonetheless 
holding that, unlike all other forms of government speech, race-
conscious measures are not entitled to the broad immunity of the 
doctrine. 
Justice Thomas, who wrote a separate concurrence, went even 
further than his plurality brethren.  While the plurality would support 
race-conscious measures that satisfy the narrow-tailoring requirements 
discussed above, Justice Thomas made clear his general view that all 
government uses of race are unconstitutional.213  Like the other Justices 
in the plurality, Justice Thomas stated that school districts can use race-
conscious measures to correct past intentional discrimination but not 
 209 Id. at 746 (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) 
mas, J., concurring) (“[A]s a general rule, all race-based government 
ecisio xt—is unconstitutional.”); see also id. at 751 (“The 
roceeds in good faith with arguably pure motives.”). 
(plurality opinion)). 
 210 Id. 
 211 Id. (quoting Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 657 (1993)). 
 212 Id. at 740-48. 
 213 Id. at 752 (Tho
d nmaking—regardless of conte
Constitution does not permit race-based government decisionmaking simply because a school 
district claims a remedial purpose and p
27
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diation is “a one-time process 
invo
us measures, he declared that “[a]ssertions of general 
socie
d on his fervent opposition to race-conscious measures, it is 
unlik
 
racial imbalance in schools.214  Even then, unlike his plurality brethren, 
he believes that such acceptable reme
lving the redress of a discrete legal injury inflicted by an identified 
entity.”215  According to Justice Thomas, “the further we get from the era 
of state-sponsored racial separation, the less likely it is that racial 
imbalance has a traceable connection to any prior segregation.”216  He 
rejected the Seattle and Jefferson County plans as failing to serve 
acceptable race-based compelling interests because they lacked a 
“cognizable interest in remediation.”217 
Justice Thomas stated that race-conscious plans send a demeaning 
message: “every time the government places citizens on racial registers 
and makes race relevant to the provision of burdens or benefits, it 
demeans us all.”218  In other words, he believes that benign and invidious 
race-conscious plans alike send demeaning messages.  Perhaps signaling 
where Justice Thomas would stand with respect to government speech 
and race-conscio
tal discrimination are plainly insufficient.”219  In Justice Thomas’s 
view, voluntary race-conscious plans convey a message of “racial 
paternalism” with effects that are “poisonous and pernicious as any other 
form of discrimination.”220  Justice Thomas also rejected race-conscious 
government actions designed to unite the races.221  He believes such 
actions create “resentment,” “racial tension,” and “pit[] the races against 
one another.”222 
Base
ely that Justice Thomas would accept the government-speech 
doctrine’s principle of judicial deference to school-board speech.223  For 
instance, in opposing deference in Parents Involved, he essentially 
argued that the Court cannot approve school use of race-conscious 
 214 Id. at 755-56. 
mphasis added). 
urring)). 
6 U.S. 267, 274 (1986) (plurality opinion); 
egen iv. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 310 (1978)). 
t 759 (citing Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 241 (1995) (Thomas, 
., con
To adopt the dissent’s deferential approach [to the school districts] would be to 
bdica al responsibilities.”). 
 215 Id. at 756 (e
 216 Id. (citing Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 496 (1992); Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 
118 (1995) (Thomas, J., conc
 217 Id. at 757. 
 218 Id. at 752 (citing Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 353 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part)). 
 219 Id. at 755 (emphasis added) (citing City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 
499, 504 (1989); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 47
R ts of Un
 220 Id. a
J curring in part and concurring in the judgment)). 
 221 Id. 
 222 Id. 
 223 Id. at 766 (“
a te our constitution
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overnment speech of “socialization and good 
citize
and of 300 million people one Nation” satisfy Justice 







ool boards cannot plausibly maintain that their plans further 
ted States 





measures to create a more inclusive America.224  Justice Thomas also 
rejected the message of pluralism as justification for the race-conscious 
plans.225 
The race-based g
nship” would not be sufficient for Justice Thomas to uphold race-
based plans.226  Neither would an educational message that promotes 
“the kind of cooperation among Americans of all races that is necessary 
to make a l
 uniquely relevant to schools or uniquely teachable in a form
ational setting.”228 
Justice Thomas, given his parameters for race-conscious stude
gnment plans that would serve a compelling interest, would like
ose a move to government-speech jurisprudence for race-conscio
s: 
[T]he sch
a compelling interest. . . .  [O]nly those measures the State must take 
to provide a bulwark against anarchy . . . or to prevent violence and a 
government’s effort to remedy past discrimination for which it is 
responsible constitute compelling interests. Neither of the parties has 
argued—nor could they—that race-based student as igs nment is 
necessary to provide a bulwark against anarchy or to prevent 
violence.229 
Justice Thomas’s opposition comes from his belief in and advocacy of a 
colorblind Constitution.230  In fact, he stated that he is “quite comfortable 
in the company” of those who espouse that the Uni
231
Justice Kennedy—a critical and likely swing vote on future rac
cious student-assignment plans232—has given some indication 
re he might stand on race-conscious government-spe
 224 Id. at 766 n.14. 
 225 Id. at 766. 
 226 Id. at 767-68. 
 227 Id. at 767 (criticizing this “democratic interest” as “limitless in scope”). 
 228 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 348 
(2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). 
 229 Id. at 771 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
 230 Id. at 772. 
 231 Id. 
 232 See generally Preston Green, III, Bruce D. Baker & Joseph O. Oluwole, Achieving Racial 
Equal Educational Opportunity Through School Finance Litigation, 4 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 283 
(2008); Oluwole & Green, supra note 179. 
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juris ce 
by e of racial unity that the 
districts sought to convey through their race-conscious plans: 
ool districts in different parts of 
240
school authorities must accept the status quo of racial isolation in 
schools, it is, in my view, profoundly mistaken.”241  According to him, 
school districts may properly attempt to correct racial isolation as well as 
prudence.  Justice Kennedy began his Parents Involved concurren
acknowledging and lauding the messag
[S]chools strive to teach that our strength comes from people of 
different races, creeds, and cultures uniting in commitment to the 
freedom of all.  In these cases two sch
the country seek to teach that principle by having classrooms that 
reflect the racial makeup of the surrounding community.  That the 
school districts consider these plans to be necessary should remind us 
our highest aspirations are yet unfulfilled.233 
He expressed concern, however, that the districts’ race-conscious plans 
might communicate and indeed “entrench the very prejudices we seek to 
overcome.”234  In essence, Justice Kennedy considered speech crucial to 
the analysis of race-conscious plans.235 
Justice Kennedy expressed anxiety that official racial labeling could 
be a threat to individuality.236  Labeling is, of course, a form of speech.  
Justice Kennedy’s concern arose from the fact that labeling 
communicates a message that is “inconsistent with the dignity of 
individuals in our society.”237  Further, he observed that a racial label is 
“a label that an individual is powerless to change.”238 
Justice Kennedy rejects messages of racial inferiority, calling such 
messages illegitimate.239  He approves a message of equal opportunity, 
which he characterizes as “legitimate.”   He also made it clear that he 
rejects the message of racial isolation, noting that “[t]o the extent the 
plurality opinion suggests the Constitution mandates that state and local 
 
 233 Parents Involved IV, 551 U.S. at 782 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
the judgment). 
 234 Id. 
 235 The speech here is a prejudicial message that could come from racial grouping/labeling.  
rned that such speech should be cautiously managed lest it communicate 
Id. at 797.  He also expressed fears that such speech could communicate to students 
tigmatized.  Id. at 798. 
. 





that they are s
 236 Id. at 797. 
 237 Id
 238 Id. 
 239 Id. at 783 (c
o n)). 
 240 Id. at 787-88. 
 241 Id. at 
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school district’s efforts to achieve diversity 
when
conscious plan could meet Justice 
Kenn
nclude 





th  student-body compositions 
 
“de facto resegregation in schooling.”242  He stated that there is a 
compelling interest in avoiding isolation, an interest that districts are free 
to pursue.243 
Despite his concerns regarding racial labeling, Justice Kennedy 
declared that school districts can pursue diversity as a compelling 
interest.244  He accepts a 
 race is one of the components of the definition.245  He is evidently 
open to benign race-conscious plans that explain when and how race will 
be used, and clearly identify who will make the race-based decisions.246  
He also requires that school districts provide a “convincing explanation” 
for their plans’ designs.247 
Justice Kennedy cautioned that when the message is racial 
integration, “ambiguities become all the more problematic in light of the 
contradictions and confusions that result.”248  In other words, it is likely 
that a more precisely defined race-
edy’s approval.249  He requires that districts’ plans “first define 
what it means to be of a race. Who exactly is white and who is 
nonwhite?”250  The Jefferson County and Seattle plans did not i
ribe the plans was imprecise.251 
Justice Kennedy indicated that, while he supports elementary a
ndary schools’ use of race-conscious plans to achieve divers
ols must not sacrifice student individuality.252  He stated that: 
If school authorities are concerned that e
of certain schools interfere with the objective of offering an equal 
educational opportunity to all of their students, they are free to devise 
race-conscious measures to address the problem in a general way and 
 242 Id. See Carter, supra note 6, at 21 (characterizing de facto segregation as expression). 
 243 Parents Involved IV, 551 U.S. at 798 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
98 (“[N]eighborhoods in our communities do not reflect the 
ivers
iversity, but other demographic 




sing language such as “fails to make clear,” “failed to explain why,” 
nd “d . 
. 
the judgment). 
 244 Id. at 783; see also id. at 7
d ity of our Nation as a whole.”). 
 245 Id. at 788, 798 (“Race may be one component of that d
fa s, plus special talents a
 246 See id. at 78
 247 Id. at 787. 
 248 Id. at 785 (emphasis added)
 249 Id. at 785-87.
 250 Id. at 797. 
 251 See id. at 786-87 (u
a oes not explain how”)
 252 See id. at 787-90
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ly 
allo e-conscious measures to communicate their 




indi  a 
clas 256  
In lling 
individual students that their primary or only identity is race.  With 
e 
the above discussion that Justice Kennedy would approve race-conscious 
measures promoting such messages as diversity, equal education 
ppo
without treating each student in different fashion solely on the basis of 
a systematic, individual typing by race.253 
Under a government-speech analysis, Justice Kennedy would like
w districts to use rac
” through such measures as 
strategic site selection of new schools; drawing attendance zones with 
general recognition of the demographics of neighborhoods; allocating 
resources for special programs; recruiting students and faculty in a 
targeted fashion; and tracking enrollments, performance, and other 
statistics by race.254 
Justice Kennedy favors these measures because he believes th
le they are race-conscious, they do not sacrifice stud
viduality.255  He stated that these measures are not “based on
sification that tells each student he or she is to be defined by race.”
essence, Justice Kennedy cautioned against measures te
respect to these race-conscious measures, he opined: 
Executive and legislative branches, which for generations now have 
considered these types of policies and procedures, should be permitted 
to employ them with candor and with confidence that a constitutional 
violation does not occur whenever a decisionmaker considers the 
impact a given approach might have on students of different races.257 
Justice Kennedy concluded that school districts should not view the 
Court’s decision as preventing their efforts to bring students of diverse 
racial background together.258  In other words, Justice Kennedy does not 
want to disempower school districts.  Indeed, on could conclude from 
o rtunity and racial unity, as long as those measures do not also 
 
 253 Id. at 788-89. 
 254 Id. at 789 (revealing that, under Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence, Justice Kennedy 
ly strict scrutiny to such race-conscious measures).  Justice Thomas’s preference for 




2 31 and accompanying text. 
 255 Parents Involved IV, 551 U.S. at 789. 
 256 Id. (emphasis added). 
 257 Id. 
 258 Id. at 798. 
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No. 1 was “racially 
integ
al decisionmaking.  Justice Breyer emphasized this 





convey messages of racial hostility by individually typing students by 
race. 
In the dissent, Justice Breyer made it clear that the dissenting 
Justices would approve race-conscious measures.259  According to 
Justice Breyer, the message of the race-conscious plans of Jefferson 
County Public Schools and Seattle School District 
rated education . . . long ago promised—efforts that this Court has 
repeatedly required, permitted, and encouraged local authorities to 
undertake.”260  He stated that the Constitution authorizes local school 
districts to choose race-conscious measures to convey this message.261 
Recall that the immunity provided to the government by the 
government-speech doctrine implies judicial deference to the 
government when it speaks.262  In essence, the government-speech 
doctrine embraces loc
h of the determination of how to achieve integration to the judgme
cal communities.”263  Further, he highlighted the fact that the Brown 
rt had ruled that: 
 259 See generally id. at 803-68 (Breyer, J., dissenting, joined by Ginsburg, Stevens, and 
Souter, JJ.).  Of course, the dissenting Justices support race-conscious plans conveying remedial 
messages.  See id. at 818-20, 838 (“[T]here is a historical and remedial element: an interest in setting 
right the consequences of prior conditions of segregation.”).  While Justice Stevens agreed with 
Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion, he wrote a separate dissenting opinion to emphasize his belief 
that race-conscious measures that communicate the inclusion of racial minorities, particularly in 
schools, should not be prohibited.  Id. at 798-803 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 260 Id. at 803 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also id. at 805-06. 
 261 Id. at 803-04, 823; see also id. at 821 (“A court finding of de jure segregation cannot be 
the crucial variable.”). Justice Breyer also declared: 
Louisville’s history makes clear that a community under a court order to desegregate might 
submit a race-conscious remedial plan before the court dissolved the order, but with every 
intention of following that plan even after dissolution.  How could such a plan be lawful the 
day before dissolution but then become unlawful the very next day?  On what legal ground 
can the majority rest its contrary view? 
Are courts really to treat as merely de facto segregated those school districts that avoided a 
federal order by voluntarily complying with Brown’s requirements?  This Court has 
previously done just the opposite, permitting a race-conscious remedy without any kind of 
court decree.  Because the Constitution emphatically does not forbid the use of race-
conscious measures by districts in the South that voluntarily desegregated their schools, on 
what basis does the plurality claim that the law forbids Seattle to do the same? 
Id. at 821-22 (citations omitted). 
 262 See Gey, supra note 111, at 1262. (“Government speech claims always arise in the context 
of First Amendment disputes with private speakers, and in these cases the private speakers lose their 
First Amendment claim not because the Court views the private speakers’ expressive claims as 
weak, but rather because the Court views the government’s competing expressive interests as 
stronger.”); Blocher, supra note 18, at 697, 711; Cambron-McCabe, supra note 119, at 754, 773. 
 263 Parents Involved IV, 551 U.S. at 804 (Breyer, J. dissenting) (referring to the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)). 
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t educational policy and might well conclude, 
for example, that in order to prepare students to live in a pluralistic 
neutral policies. 
 
School authorities are traditionally charged with broad power to 
formulate and implemen
society each school should have a prescribed ratio of Negro to white 
students reflecting the proportion for the district as a whole.  To do 
this as an educational policy is within the broad discretionary powers 
of school authorities.264 
This quote also reveals that Justice Breyer and his dissenting 
colleagues endorse race-conscious measures aimed at pluralism.  This 
pluralism policy includes an “interest in producing an educational 
environment that reflects the pluralistic society in which our children will 
live.”265  It also aligns with other laudable goals the dissenting Justices 
support: the racial harmony and cooperation evident in children of all 
races playing and working together.266 
Expounding on the local control rationale, Justice Breyer observed 
that 267the “complexity” and “practical difficulties”  of achieving racially 
integrated schools justify giving school districts flexibility to implement 
race-conscious plans.268  He opined that evidence in favor of an 
educational interest in racially integrated schools is so strong that it 
provides a reasonable basis to find the interest compelling.269 
Justice Breyer expressed his approval of racial balancing as he 
advocated for deference to local officials in pursuing such plans.270  
Specifically, he noted that the Supreme Court has ruled that schools 
“have wide discretion in formulating school policy, and . . . as a matter of 
educational policy school authorities may well conclude that some kind 
of racial balance in the schools is desirable quite apart from any 
constitutional requirements.”271  This language indicates that the 
dissenting Justices would support school districts that choose, under the 
government-speech doctrine, to favor racial balancing policies over race 
 264 Id. at 804-05 (emphasis added) (quoting Swann v. Charlotte–Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 
02 U
nal quotation marks omitted) (citing Swann, 402 U.S. at 16). 
1. 
2. 
eedom is limited to school 
istric red desegregation measures are also in effect.”). 
4 .S. 1, 16 (1971)). 
 265 Id. at 840 (inter
 266 See id. at 84
 267 Id. at 82
 268 See id. 
 269 Id. at 839. 
 270 Id. at 823-24. 
 271 Id. (internal quotations omitted) (quoting N.C. Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43, 45 
(1971)); see also id. at 824 (“These statements nowhere suggest that this fr
d ts where court-orde
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Justice Thomas’s “colorblind” message, while 
emph
able for its speech at the ballot 
box.   In Parents Involved, the dissent emphasized a similar rationale 
for n 
Cou
racial classification sometimes 
serve
  He reasoned that “[p]rimary and 
secondary schools are where the education of this Nation’s children 
The dissenting Justices endorsed fostering unity among the races.272  
They rejected 
asizing that messages designed to discriminate against minorities 
should not be equated, in constitutional terms, with messages designed to 
include them.273 
Recall that a rationale for the government-speech doctrine is that 
citizens may hold the government account
274
their support of the voluntary race conscious plans of Jefferso
nty and Seattle School District No. 1: 
[A] judge would also be aware that a legislature or school 
administrators, ultimately accountable to the electorate, could 
nonetheless properly conclude that a 
s a purpose important enough to overcome the risks they 
mention, for example, helping to end racial isolation or to achieve a 
diverse student body in public schools.275 
Justice Breyer found the Jefferson County and Seattle School 
District plans acceptable because they did not seek to “pit the races 
against each other or otherwise significantly exacerbate racial 
tensions.”276  The districts had an acceptable message: the voluntary 
race-conscious plans were designed to foster racial unity rather than 
racial isolation.277  Other forms of acceptable speech Justice Breyer 
recognized were the promotion of less racial prejudice and “interracial 
sociability and friendship.”278
 
 272 See id. at 829. 
 273 Id. at 830.  Justice Breyer, writing for the dissenting Justices, reasoned that “[t]he 
e 
 831 (citation omitted). 
of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 235 (2000) 
When the government speaks, for instance to promote its own policies or to advance a particular 
 accountable to the electorate and the political process for its advocacy.  If the 
constitutional principle enunciated in Swann, reiterated in subsequent cases, and relied upon over 
many years, provides, and has widely been thought to provide, authoritative legal guidance.  And if 
the plurality now chooses to reject that principle . . . it must explain to the courts and to the Nation 
why it would abandon guidance set forth many years before, guidance that countless others hav
built upon over time, and which the law has continuously embodied.”  Id. at
 274 See Board 
(“
idea, it is, in the end,
citizenry objects, newly elected officials later could espouse some different or contrary position.”). 
 275 Parents Involved IV, 551 U.S. at 836-37 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 276 Id. at 835. 
 277 Id. 
 278 Id. at 841. 
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begin
 the various messages above, the nation will 
hopefully progress into an era when there may no longer be a need for 
 measures. 
 
s, where each of us begins to absorb those values we carry with us 
to the end of our days.”279 
It is evident from the above discussion of the Parents Involved 
dissent that there is support on the Court for deference to school districts 
when it comes to benign use of race.  Clearly, a faction of the Court does 
not support the plurality’s redlining of benign voluntary race-conscious 
plans.280  Consequently, a school district’s advocacy for diversity, racial 
harmony, pluralism, interracial sociability through race-conscious 
policies might survive.  Advocates for diversity, racial unity, pluralism, 
racial integration and racial inclusion in elementary and secondary 
education must not give up the fight now.  For we know that “unless our 
children begin to learn together, there is little hope that our people will 
ever learn to live together.”281  If schools are allowed to implement race-
conscious plans conveying
race-conscious
 279 Id. at 842; see also id. at 843 (“The compelling interest at issue here, then, includes an 
effort to eradicate the remnants, not of general societal discrimination, but of primary and secondary 
school segregation; it includes an effort to create school environments that provide better educational 
opportunities for all children; it includes an effort to help create citizens better prepared to know, to 
understand, and to work with people of all races and backgrounds, thereby furthering the kind of 
democratic government our Constitution foresees.  If an educational interest that combines these 
three elements is not compelling, what is?” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). 
 280 While Justices Stevens and Souter have retired from the Court, Justices Kagan and 
Sotomayor—two Justices nominated by the Obama administration to replace Stevens and Souter 
respectively—are likely to continue the support for race-conscious measures. See, e.g., Calhoun v. 
U.S., 133 S. Ct. 1136 (2013) (setting forth Justice Sotomayor’s strongly-worded statements against 
racial prejudice); Richard L. Hasen, End Of The Dialogue? Political Polarization, the Supreme 
Court, and Congress, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 205, 242-251 (2013) (describing political polarization of 
the Supreme Court); Vikram David Amar, Is Honesty The Best (Judicial) Policy in Affirmative 
Action Cases? Fisher v. University Of Texas Gives the Court (Yet) Another Chance to Say Yes, 65 
VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 77, 78, 85 & n.39 (2012) (noting that Justice Kagan recused herself from 
the case and suggesting that with respect to the Fisher case, which regards race-based affirmative 
action in higher education, Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Breyer would vote together while 
Justices Thomas, Scalia, Roberts and Alito would vote together). See also id. at 85 n.39 (“Justice 
Sotomayor has yet to vote in a conventional race-based affirmative action case at the Court.”).  
Further, during a 2001 speech, Justice Sotomayor spoke about the impact of a judge’s race on his or 
her judicial decisions: “I would hope that a wise Latina woman with the richness of her experiences 
would more often than not reach a better conclusion than a white male who hasn’t lived that life.” 
Charlie Savage, A Judge’s View of Judging Is on the Record, N.Y. TIMES (May 14, 2009), 
www.nytimes.com/2009/05/15/us/15judge.html. See Kenneth Duvall, The Defendant Was Not 
Heard . . . Now What?: Prejudice Analysis, Harmless Error Review, And the Right to Testify, 35 
HAMLINE L. REV. 279, 320 (2012) (noting that “Justice Kagan often votes with Justice Sotomayor-
they voted together more often last term than any other Supreme Court pairing save Justices Roberts 
and Alito”). 
 281 Id. at 842 (quoting Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 783 (1974) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting)); see also id. at 868 (“The last half century has witnessed great strides toward racial 
equality, but we have not yet realized the promise of Brown.  To invalidate the plans under review is 
to threaten the promise of Brown.  The plurality’s position, I fear, would break that promise.”). 
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uch messages regarding the continued salience 
of ra
ed above,  as the plans are “effectively controlled”  by the 
local




It is evident from Parents Involved that at least five of the Justices 
found merit in the pursuit of diversity through voluntary race-conscious 
student assignment plans.282  Also evident is that Justice Kennedy does 
not support race-conscious plans that are not narrowly tailored.283  As 
mentioned above, the narrow tailoring requirement in Equal Protection 
analysis is the death knell of benign voluntary race-conscious 
measures.284  Given the apparently insurmountable nature of that 
requirement, the government-speech doctrine may provide a needed 
opening for school districts that seek to promote diversity and racial 
integration.  Given that “s
ce are both generated by and subject to correction through the 
political process, government-speech principles counsel against allowing 
individuals to transform their disagreements with those messages into 
constitutional claims.”285 
As Professor Carter points out, “[r]ace consciousness itself has 
become a constitutional harm, regardless of its tangible effects.”286  A 
government-speech jurisprudence might help us reverse this.  Benign 
voluntary race-conscious plans would likely meet the Johanns index of 
control not 287 288
 school boards.  Schools can ensure that their plans meet the 
Johanns index of control by establishing the overarching message the 
plans convey and by retaining final approval authority over all aspects of 
the plans. 
The government-speech jurisprudence would not require that school 
districts be viewpoint-neutral or 
conscious plans.  Besides, as Professor Carter observes, the 
judiciary should not dictate to or second-guess a majority-white 
community that decides it is willing to “disadvantage itself for what it 
sees as a greater social good.”289 
 282 Id. at 865. 
 283 Id. at 784-87 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 284 See supra notes 140-143 and accompanying text. 
 285 Carter, supra note 6, at 43. 
 286 Id. at 2. 
 287 See supra note 67. 
 288 Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 560 (2005). 
 289 Carter, supra note 6, at 55 (“When a numerical and electoral majority that has not faced a 
history of subordination or stigmatization has freely chosen to disadvantage itself for what it sees as 
a greater social good, that majority is able to remedy its situation through the ballot box.  There 
would presumably be no need for a judicial check on the majoritarian process because the self-
disadvantaging group is the majority.”). 
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asures 
mov
ka, Kansas, in the 1950’s to Louisville and Seattle in the 
mod
“judges are not well suited to act as 




th  typical 
sch
programs that some districts now consider critical.   By continuing to 
We must not confuse government speech that seeks to segregate 
races from speech that seeks to include minorities in our nation’s future.  
Invidious and pernicious race-conscious measures must remain subject to 
strict scrutiny even while benign voluntary race-conscious me
e to review under government-speech doctrine.  This is critical 
because segregation policies were not only repugnant for defining 
minorities as inferior, “they perpetuated a caste system rooted in the 
institutions of slavery and 80 years of legalized subordination.”290 
Those who oppose the benign use of race should remember that 
“[t]he lesson of history is not that efforts to continue racial segregation 
are constitutionally indistinguishable from efforts to achieve racial 
integration.”291  To pretend that benign and invidious race-conscious 
plans are the same is wrong; for it is “a cruel distortion of history to 
compare Tope
ern day—to equate the plight of Linda Brown (who was ordered to 
attend a Jim Crow school) to the circumstances of Joshua McDonald 
(whose request to transfer to a school closer to home was initially 
declined).”292 
We must keep in mind that 
293
es dictating solutions that override local efforts to addre
gregation.  Unlike non-elected federal judges, school boards 
untable to their communities: 
[A] school board is elected by the public, and until its current 
members are voted out of office, they “speak” for the school district 
through the policies they adopt.  Furthermore, in the case of e
ool board, influence from the community does not end at the ballot 
box, but continues through publicly-held school board meetings at 
which parents and other interested parties may express satisfaction or 
dissatisfaction with the school board’s policies or “speech.”294 
We must empower districts to use the tool of race-conscious 
295
 
 290 Parents Involved IV, 551 U.S. 701, 867 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
e inclusive use of 
 291 Id. 
 292 Id. 
 293 Id. at 848-49. 
 294 Downs v. Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1003, 1016 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 295 Parents Involved IV, 551 U.S. at 862 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also id. at 866 (“And 
what of respect for democratic local decisionmaking by States and school boards?  For several 
decades this Court has rested its public school decisions upon Swann’s basic view that the 
Constitution grants local school districts a significant degree of leeway where th
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us measures and our entire country should 
“fear
e that our people will ever learn to live 
together.”   It is up to us—We the People—to “debate how best to 
educate the Nation’s children and how best to administer America’s 
schools to achieve that aim.”298 
 
 
apply the Equal Protection Clause strict-scrutiny analysis to benign race-
conscious measures, we obstruct schools from promoting the compelling 
ideals of diversity and racial inclusion.  If we continue on this path, 
advocates of race-conscio
 the consequences of doing so for the law, for the schools, for the 
democratic process, and for America’s efforts to create, out of its 
diversity, one Nation.”296 
In order not to undermine the efforts and messages of local school 
districts, benign voluntary race-conscious measures should be viewed as 
government speech.  Under this approach, the electorate will be able to 
hold the government accountable, while districts will retain the flexibility 
and creativity to implement policies of pluralism, racial integration, and 
racial harmony.  In so doing, we will equip students to deal with our 
pluralistic society and sustain the core values of our democracy.  History 
has put us on notice that “the fate of race relations in this country 
depends upon unity among our children, for unless our children begin to 
learn together, there is little hop
297
race-conscious criteria is at issue.  Now localities will have to cope with the difficult problems they 
face (including resegregation) deprived of one means they may find necessary.”). 
 296 Id. at 863. 
 297 Id. at 864 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 
783 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting)). 
 298 Id. at 862. 
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